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Abstract
A parametric down-conversion (PDC) source can be used as either a triggered single photon
source or an entangled photon source in quantum key distribution (QKD). The triggering PDC
QKD has already been studied in the literature. On the other hand, a model and a post-processing
protocol for the entanglement PDC QKD are still missing. In this paper, we fill in this important
gap by proposing such a model and a post-processing protocol for the entanglement PDC QKD.
Although the PDC model is proposed to study the entanglement-based QKD, we emphasize that
our generic model may also be useful for other non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source.
Since an entangled PDC source is a basis independent source, we apply Koashi-Preskill’s security
analysis to the entanglement PDC QKD. We also investigate the entanglement PDC QKD with
two-way classical communications. We find that the recurrence scheme increases the key rate and
Gottesman-Lo protocol helps tolerate higher channel losses. By simulating a recent 144km open-air
PDC experiment, we compare three implementations — entanglement PDC QKD, triggering PDC
QKD and coherent state QKD. The simulation result suggests that the entanglement PDC QKD
can tolerate higher channel losses than the coherent state QKD. The coherent state QKD with
decoy states is able to achieve highest key rate in the low and medium-loss regions. By applying
Gottesman-Lo two-way post-processing protocol, the entanglement PDC QKD can tolerate up to
70dB combined channel losses (35dB for each channel) provided that the PDC source is placed in
between Alice and Bob. After considering statistical fluctuations, the PDC setup can tolerate up
to 53dB channel losses.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There are mainly two types of quantum key distribution (QKD) schemes. One is the
prepare-and-measure scheme such as BB84 [1] and the other is the entanglement based
QKD such as Ekert91 [2]. The security of both types of QKD has been proven in the last
decade, see for example, [3, 4, 5]. For a review of quantum cryptography, one may refer
to [6]. Meanwhile, researchers have also proven the security of QKD with realistic devices,
such as [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
In the original proposal of the BB84 protocol, a single photon source is required. Unfor-
tunately, single photon sources are still not commercially available. Instead, a weak coherent
state source is widely used as an imperfect single photon source. Throughout this paper, we
call this implementation as coherent state QKD. Many coherent state QKD experiments have
been performed since the first QKD experiment [14], see for example [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20].
Decoy state method [21] has been proposed as a useful method for substantially improving
the performance of the coherent state QKD. The security of QKD with decoy states has
been proven [22, 23, 24]. Asymptotically, the coherent state QKD with decoy states is
able to operate as good as QKD with perfect single photon sources in the sense that the
key generation rates given by both setups linearly depend on the channel transmittance
[24]. Afterwards, some practical decoy-state protocols are proposed [25, 26, 27, 28]. The
experimental demonstrations for decoy state method have been done recently [29, 30, 31,
32, 33, 34]. Other than decoy state method, there are other approaches to enhance the
performance of the coherent state QKD, such as QKD with strong reference pulses [35, 36]
and differential-phase-shift QKD [37].
Besides the coherent source, there is another source that can be used for QKD — para-
metric down-conversion (PDC) source. With a PDC source, one can realize either prepare-
and-measure or entanglement-based QKD protocols. To implement a prepare-and-measure
QKD protocol, one can use a PDC source as a triggered single photon source. To imple-
ment an entanglement-based QKD protocol, on the other hand, one can use the polarization
entanglement between two modes of the light emitted from a PDC source. We call these
two implementations triggering PDC QKD and entanglement PDC QKD. With a entangled
source, one can also implement QKD protocols based on causality [38] and Bell’s inequality
[39].
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The model and post-processing of the triggering PDC QKD have already been studied
[8]. Recently, there are some practical decoy state proposals for the triggering PDC QKD
[40, 41, 42]. In this paper, we will focus on the asymptotic decoy state protocol [24], which
is the upper bound of all these practical decoy state protocols when threshold detectors are
used by Alice and Bob.
On the other hand, the model and post-processing for the entanglement PDC QKD are
still missing. In this paper, we present a model for the entanglement PDC QKD. From the
model, we find that an entangled PDC source is a basis independent source for QKD. Based
on this observation, we propose a post-processing scheme by applying Koashi-Preskill’s
security analysis [12].
Recently, a free-space distribution of entangled photons over 144 km has been demon-
strated [43]. We simulate this experiment setup and compare three QKD implementations:
entanglement PDC QKD, triggering PDC QKD and coherent state QKD. In the simulation,
we also apply Gottesman-Lo two-way post-processing protocol [44] and a recurrence scheme
[45], see also [46].
The main contributions of this paper are:
• We present a model for the entanglement PDC QKD. Although the model is proposed
to study the entanglement-based QKD, this generic model may also be useful for other
non-QKD experiments involving a PDC source.
• From the model, we find that an entangled PDC source is a basis independent source
for QKD. Based on this observation, we propose a post-processing scheme for the
entanglement PDC QKD. Essentially, we apply Koashi-Preskill’s security analysis [12].
• By simulating a PDC experiment [43], we compare three QKD implementations: en-
tanglement PDC QKD, triggering PDC QKD and coherent state QKD. In the entan-
glement PDC QKD, we consider two cases: source in the middle and source at Alice’s
side.
• In the case that the PDC source is placed in between Alice and Bob, we find that
the entanglement PDC QKD can tolerate the highest channel losses, up to 70 dB
by applying Gottesman-Lo two-way classical communication post-processing protocol
[44]. We remark that a 35dB channel loss is comparable to the estimated loss in a
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satellite to ground transmission in the literature [47, 48].
• We consider statistical fluctuations for the entanglement PDC QKD. In this case, the
PDC setup can tolerate up to 53dB channel loss.
• The coherent state QKD with decoy states is able to achieve highest key rate in the
low- and medium-loss regions.
In Section II, we will review two experiment setups of the entanglement PDC QKD. In
Section III, we will model the entanglement PDC QKD. In Appendix A, we calculate the
quantum bit error rate in the entanglement PDC QKD. In Section IV, we will propose a
post-processing scheme for the entanglement PDC QKD. In Section V, we will compare
the entanglement PDC QKD, the triggering PDC QKD and the coherent state QKD by
simulating a real PDC experiment. We also apply protocols based on two-way classical
communications and consider statistical fluctuations. In Appendix B, we investigate the
optimal µ for the entanglement PDC QKD.
II. IMPLEMENTATION
In general, the PDC source does not necessarily belong to one of the two legitimate users
of QKD, Alice or Bob. One can even assume that an eavesdropper, Eve, owns the PDC
source. In this section we will compare two experimental setups of the entanglement PDC
QKD due to the position of the PDC source, in between Alice and Bob or at Alice’s side.
Let us start with a general discussion about an entangled PDC source. With the rotating-
wave approximation, the Hamiltonian of the PDC process can be written as [49]
H = iχ(a†Hb
†
V − a†V b†H) + h.c. (1)
where h.c. means Hermitian conjugate and χ is a coupling constant depending on the crystal
nonlinearity and the amplitude of the pump beam. The operators ai and bi are the annihi-
lation operators for rectilinear polarizations i ∈ {H, V } in mode a and b respectively. Mode
a and mode b are the modes sent to Alice and Bob, respectively.
In the Section III, we will focus on modeling the measurement of the rectilinear polariza-
tion (Z) basis. Due to symmetry, all the calculations can be applied to X basis too.
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A. Source in the middle
First we consider the case that the PDC source sits in between Alice and Bob. The
schematic diagram is shown in FIG. 1.
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FIG. 1: A schematic diagram for the entanglement PDC QKD. Alice and Bob connect to a entan-
gled PDC source by optical links. They each receives one of two entangled modes coming out from
the PDC source. Both Alice and Bob randomly choose basis (by polarization controllers) to mea-
sure the arrived signals (by single photon detectors). PC: polarization controller; PBS: polarized
beam splitter; DA0, DA1, DB0, DB1: threshold detectors.
As shown in FIG. 1, a PDC source provides two entangled modes, a and b, which are sent
to Alice and Bob, respectively. After receiving the signals, Alice and Bob each randomly
chooses a basis (X or Z) to perform a measurement. One key observation of this setup
is that the state emitted from the PDC source is independent of the bases Alice and Bob
choose for the measurements.
B. Source at Alice’s side
Another case is that Alice owns the PDC source. The schematic diagram is shown in
FIG. 2.
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FIG. 2: A schematic diagram for the entanglement PDC QKD. Alice measures one of entangled
modes coming out from the PDC source and sends Bob the other mode.
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Compare FIG. 1 and 2, we can see that the only difference is the position of the PDC
source. As we will see in Section IV, the post-processing these two setups are similar.
We remark that in the second setup, Alice’s measurement commutes with Bob’s mea-
surement. Thus, we have the same observation as before that the PDC source state is
independent of the measurement bases.
Therefore, for both setups the entangled PDC source is a basis-independent source. It
follows that the entanglement PDC QKD is a basis independent QKD.
III. MODEL
In this section, we will model entangled PDC sources, channel and detectors for the
entanglement PDC QKD. We emphasize that this model is applicable for both experiment
setups described in Section II.
A. An entangled PDC source
From Eq. (1), the state emitted from a type-II PDC source can be written as [49]
|Ψ〉 = (coshχ)−2
∞∑
n=0
√
n+ 1 tanhn χ|Φn〉, (2)
where |Φn〉 is the state of an n-photon-pair, given by
|Φn〉 = 1√
n + 1
n∑
m=0
(−1)m|n−m,m〉a|m,n−m〉b. (3)
For example, when n = 1, Eq. (3) will give a Bell state,
|Φ1〉 = 1√
2
(|1, 0〉a|0, 1〉b − |0, 1〉a|1, 0〉b)
=
1√
2
(| ↔〉a| l〉b − | l〉a| ↔〉b),
(4)
Here we use the polarizations |1, 0〉 = | ↔〉 and |0, 1〉 = | l〉 as a qubit basis (Z basis) for
QKD. From Eq. (2), the probability to get an n-photon-pair is
P (n) =
(n + 1)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
(5)
where we define λ ≡ sinh2 χ. The expected photon pair number is µ = 2λ, which is the
average number of photon pairs generated by one pump pulse, characterizing the brightness
of a PDC source.
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B. Detection
We assume that the detection probabilities of the photons in the state of Eq. (3) are in-
dependent. Define ηA and ηB to be the detection efficiencies for Alice and Bob, respectively.
Both ηA and ηB take into account of the channel losses, detector efficiencies, coupling effi-
ciencies and losses inside the detector box. For an n-photon-pair, the overall transmittance
is
ηn = [1− (1− ηA)n][1− (1− ηB)n]. (6)
We remark that the channel loss is included in ηA and ηB. Thus, this model can be applied
to either of following two cases: 1) the PDC source is in between Alice and Bob or 2) the
PDC source is at Alice (or Bob)’s side.
Yield: define Yn to be the yield of an n-photon-pair, i.e., the conditional probability of a
coincidence detection event given that the PDC source emits an n-photon-pair. Yn mainly
comes from two parts, the background and the true signal. Assuming that the background
counts are independent of the signal photon detection, then Yn is given by
Yn = [1− (1− Y0A)(1− ηA)n][1− (1− Y0B)(1− ηB)n] (7)
where Y0A and Y0B are the background count rates at Alice’s and Bob’s sides, respectively.
The vacuum state contribution is Y0 = Y0AY0B. The gain of the n-photon-pair Qn, which is
the product of Eqs. (5) and (7), is given by
Qn = YnP (n)
= [1− (1− Y0A)(1− ηA)n][1− (1− Y0B)(1− ηB)n] (n+ 1)λ
n
(1 + λ)n+2
.
(8)
The overall gain is given by
Qλ =
∞∑
n=0
Qn
= 1− 1− Y0A
(1 + ηAλ)2
− 1− Y0B
(1 + ηBλ)2
+
(1− Y0A)(1− Y0B)
(1 + ηAλ+ ηBλ− ηAηBλ)2 .
(9)
Here the overall gain Qλ is the probability of a coincident detection event given a pump
pulse. Note that the parameter λ is one half of the expected photon pair number µ.
The overall quantum bit error rate (QBER, Eλ) is given by
EλQλ =e0Qλ − 2(e0 − ed)ηAηBλ(1 + λ)
(1 + ηAλ)(1 + ηBλ)(1 + ηAλ+ ηBλ− ηAηBλ) (10)
where Qλ is the gain given in Eq. (9). The calculation of the Eλ is shown in Appendix A.
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IV. POST-PROCESSING
As mentioned in Section II, the entanglement PDC QKD is a basis-independent QKD.
Thus, we can apply Koashi and Preskill’s security proof [12]. The key generation rate is
given by
R ≥ q{Qλ[1− f(δb)H2(δb)−H2(δp)]}. (11)
where q is the basis reconciliation factor (1/2 for the BB84 protocol due to the fact that
half of the time Alice and Bob disagree with the bases, and if one uses the efficient BB84
protocol [50], q ≈ 1), the subscript λ denotes for one half of the expected photon number
µ, Qλ is the overall gain, δb (δp) is the bit (phase) error rate, f(x) is the bi-direction error
correction efficiency (see, for example, [51]) as a function of error rate, normally f(x) ≥ 1
with Shannon limit f(x) = 1, and H2(x) is the binary entropy function,
H2(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x).
Due to the symmetry of X and Z bases measurements, as shown in Section II, δb and δp
are given by
δb = δp = Eλ, (12)
where Eλ is the overall QBER. This equation is true for the asymptotic limit of an infinitely
long key distribution. Later in the Subsection of VC, we will see Eq. (12) may not be true
when statistical fluctuations are taken into account.
We remark that in Koashi and Preskill’s security proof, the squash model [13] is applied.
In the squash model, Alice and Bob project the state onto the qubit Hilbert space before
X or Z measurements. For more details of the squash model, one can refer to [13]. In the
case that Alice owns the PDC source, as discussed in Subsection IIB, the key rate formula
of Eq. (11) has been proven [52] to be valid for the QKD with threshold detectors without
the squash model, see also [53]. We also notice that this post-processing scheme, Eqs. (11)
and (12), can also be derived from the security analysis based on the uncertainty principle
[54].
In Eq. (11), Qλ can be directly measured from a QKD experiment andEλ can be estimated
by error testing. In the simulation shown in Section V, we will use Eqs. (9) and (10).
We remark that the post-processing for the entanglement PDC QKD is simpler than the
coherent state QKD and triggering PDC QKD. In the entanglement PDC QKD, all the
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parameters needed for the post-processing (Qλ and Eλ) can be directly calculated or tested
from the measured classical data. In the coherent PDC QKD and the triggering PDC QKD,
on the other hand, Alice and Bob need to know the value of some experimental parameters
ahead, such as the expected photon number µ (= 2λ), and also need to estimate the gain
and error rate of the single photon states Q1 and e1, which make the statistical fluctuation
analysis difficult [28].
The post-processing can be further improved by introducing two-way classical communi-
cations between Alice and Bob [44, 46]. Also, the adding noise technique may enhance the
performance [55].
V. SIMULATION
In this section, we will first compare three QKD implementations: entanglement PDC
QKD, triggering PDC QKD and coherent state QKD. Then we will apply post-processing
protocols with two-way classical communications to the entanglement PDC QKD. Finally,
we will consider statistical fluctuations.
We deduce experimental parameters from Ref. [43] due to the model given in Subsection
III, which are listed in TABLE I. For the coherent state QKD, we use ηA = 1 since Alice
prepares the states in this case. In the following simulations, we will use q = 1/2 and
f(Eµ) = 1.22 [51].
Repetition rate Wavelength ηAlice ηBob ed Y0
249MHz 710 nm 14.5% 14.5% 1.5% 6.02× 10−6
TABLE I: Experimental parameters deduced from 144 km PDC experiment [43]. Here we assume
Alice and Bob use detectors with same characteristics. ed is the intrinsic detector error rate. Y0 is
the background count rate. ηAlice (ηBob) is the detection efficiency in Alice (Bob)’s box, including
detector efficiency and internal optical losses. The overall transmittance ηA (ηB) is the products
of Alice (Bob)’s channel transmission efficiency and ηAlice (ηBob).
The optimal expected photon number µ of the coherent state QKD has been discussed
in Ref. [8, 28]. In Appendix B, we investigate the optimal µ (2λ) for the entanglement PDC
QKD. Not surprisingly, we find that the optimal µ for the entanglement PDC QKD is in
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the order of 1, µ = 2λ = O(1). Thus, the key generation rate given in Eq. (11) depends
linearly on the channel transmittance.
A. Comparison of three QKD implementations
In the first simulation, we assume that Alice is able to adjust the expected photon pair
number µ (2λ, the brightness of the PDC source) in the region of [0, 1]. Thus, we can
optimize µ for the entanglement PDC QKD and the triggering PDC QKD. The simulation
results are shown in FIG. 3.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Plot of the key generation rate in terms of the optical loss, comparing
comparing four cases: coherent state QKD+aysmptotic decoy, triggering PDC+asymptotic decoy,
and entanglement PDC QKD (source in the middle and source at Alice’s side). For the coherent
state QKD+decoy, we use ηA = 1. We numerically optimize µ (2λ) for each curve.
From FIG. 3, we have the following remarks.
1. The entanglement PDC QKD can tolerate the highest channel losses in the case that
the source is placed in middle between Alice and Bob.
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2. The coherent state QKD with decoy states is able to achieve the highest key rate
in the low- and medium-loss region. This is because in the coherent state QKD
implementation, Alice does not need to detect any photons, which will effectively
give ηA = 1 in the PDC QKD implementations.
3. Comparing two cases of the entanglement PDC QKD: source in the middle and source
at Alice’s side, they yields similar key rate in the low- and media- region. But source
in the middle case can tolerate higher channel losses.
In the following simulations, we will focus on the case that the entangled PDC source
sits in the middle between Alice and Bob.
B. With two-way classical communications
We can also apply the idea of post-processing with two-way classical communications.
Similar to the argument of Ref. [46], we combine the recurrence idea [45] and the B steps in
the Gottesman-Lo protocol [44]. The simulation results are shown in FIG. 4.
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FIG. 4: (Color online) Plot of the key generation rate in terms of the optical loss. We apply the
recurrence idea and up to 3 B steps. µ is numerically optimized for each curve.
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From FIG. 4, we can see that the recurrence scheme can increase the key rate by around
10% and extend the maximal tolerable loss by around 1dB. The PDC experiment setup
can tolerate up to 70dB channel loss with 3 B steps. We remark that 70dB (35dB in each
channel) is comparable to the estimated loss in a satellite to ground transmission [47, 48].
This result suggests that satellite-ground QKD may be possible. However, this simulation
assumes the ideal situation that an infinite number of signals are transmitted. Moreover,
we assume that µ (the brightness of the PDC source) is a freely adjustable parameter in the
PDC experiment. In a more realistic case where a finite number of signals are transmitted
and µ is a fixed parameter, the tolerable channel loss becomes smaller, as we show next.
C. Statistical fluctuations
In Eq. (12), we assume that δb and δp are the same due to the symmetry between X
and Z measurements. Alice and Bob randomly choose to measure in X or Z basis. Then
asymptotically, δb is good estimate of δp. However, in a realistic QKD experiment, only a
finite number of signals are transmitted. Thus δp may slightly differ from δb. We assume
that Alice and Bob do not perform error testing explicitly. Instead, they obtain the bit error
rate directly from an error correction protocol (e.g., the Cascade protocol [51]). In that case,
there is no fluctuation in the bit error rate δb = Eλ. On the other hand, the phase error
rate may fluctuate to some certain value δp = δb + ǫ. Following the fluctuation analysis of
Ref. [5], we know that the probability to get a ǫ bias is
Pǫ ≤ exp[− ǫ
2n
4δb(1− δb) ], (13)
where n = NQλ the number of detection events, the product of total number of pulses N
and the overall gain Qλ.
In the 144km PDC experiment [43], the repetition rate of pump pulse is 249MHz as given
in TABLE I. As discussed in Ref. [48], the typical time of ground-satellite QKD allowed by
satellite visibility is 40 minutes. Here, we assume the experiment runs 10 minutes, which
means the data size is N = 1.5×1011. By taking this data size, we consider the fluctuations
for the entanglement PDC QKD.
In the realistic case, the brightness of the PDC source µ cannot be set freely. In the 144
km PDC experiment [43], the expected photon pair number is µ = 2λ = 0.053. After taking
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µ = 0.053 and the data size of N = 1.5 × 1011 for the fluctuation analysis, the simulation
result is shown in FIG. 5.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Plot of the key generation rate in terms of the optical loss. We take a
realistic µ = 2λ = 0.053, and consider the fluctuation with a data size of N = 1.5 × 1011 and a
confident interval of 1− Pǫ ≥ 1− e−50.
We have a couple remarks on FIG. 5.
1. In FIG. 5, if we cut off from the key rate of 10−10 [57], the entanglement PDC QKD
with one B step can tolerate up to 53dB transmission loss.
2. We have tried simulations with various µ’s. We find that the key rate is stable with
moderate changes of µ. With above fluctuation analysis, if we numerically optimize
µ for each curve, the maximal tolerable channel loss (with cut off key rate of 10−10)
is only 1dB larger than the one given by µ = 0.053. Thus, one cannot significantly
improve the maximal tolerable channel loss by just using a better PDC source in the
144km PDC experiment setup [43].
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VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a model and post-processing for the entanglement PDC QKD. We find
that the post-processing is simple by applying Koashi-Preskill’s security proof due to the fact
that the entanglement PDC QKD is a basis independent QKD. Specifically, only directly
measured data (the overall gain and the overall QBER) are needed to perform the post-
processing. By simulating a recent experiment, we compare three QKD schemes: coherent
state QKD+aysmptotic decoy, triggering PDC+asymptotic decoy, and entanglement PDC
QKD (source in the middle and at Alice’s side). We find that a) the entanglement PDC
(with source in the middle) can tolerate the highest channel loss; b) the coherent state QKD
with decoy states can achieve the highest key rate in the medium- and low-loss regions;
c) asymptotically, with a realistic PDC experiment setup, the entanglement PDC QKD
can tolerate up to 70 dB channel losses by applying post-processing schemes with two-way
classical communications; d) the PDC setup can tolerate up to 53 dB channel losses when
statistical fluctuations are taken into account.
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APPENDIX A: QUANTUM BIT ERROR RATE
Here we will study the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the entanglement PDC QKD.
Our objective is to derive the QBER formula given in Eq. (10) used in the simulation. The
QBER has three main contributions:
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1. background counts, which are random noises e0 = 1/2;
2. intrinsic detector errors, ed, which is the probability that a photon hit the erroneous
detector. ed characterizes the alignment and stability of the optical system between
Alice’s and Bob’s detection systems;
3. errors introduced by multi-photon-pair states: a) Alice and Bob may detect different
photon pairs; b) double clicks. Due to the strong pulsing attack [56], we assume that
Alice and Bob will assign a random bit when they get a double click. In either case,
the error rate will be e0 = 1/2.
Let us start with the single-photon-pair case, a Bell state given in Eq. (4). The error rate
of single-photon-pair e1 has two sources: background counts and intrinsic detector errors,
e1 = e0 − (e0 − ed)ηAηB
Y1
(A1)
If we neglect the case that both background and true signal cause clicks, then e1 can be
written as
e1 ≈ e0(Y0AY0B + Y0AηB + ηAY0B) + edηAηB
Y1
. (A2)
where e0 = 1/2 is the error rate of background counts. The first term of the numerator is
the background contribution and the second term comes from the errors of true signals.
In the following, we will discuss the errors introduced by multi-photon pair states, en
with n ≥ 2. Here we assume Alice and Bob use threshold detectors, which can only tell
whether the incoming state is vacuum or non-vacuum. One can imagine the detection of an
n-photon-pair state as follows.
1. Alice and Bob project the n-photon-pair state, Eq. (3), into Z⊗n basis.
2. Afterwards, they detect each photon with certain probabilities (ηA for Alice and ηB
for Bob).
3. If either Alice or Bob detects vacuum, then we regard it as a loss. If Alice and Bob
both detect non-vacuum only in one polarization (↔ or l), we regard it as a single
click event. Otherwise, we regard it as a double click event.
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The state of a 2-photon-pair state, according to Eq. (3), can be written as
|Φ2〉 = 1√
3
(|2, 0〉a|0, 2〉b − |1, 1〉a|1, 1〉b + |0, 2〉a|2, 0〉b
=
1√
3
[| ↔↔〉a| ll〉b − 1
2
(| ↔l〉+ | l↔〉)a ⊗ (| l↔〉+ | ↔l〉)b + | ll〉a| ↔↔〉b].
(A3)
As discussed above, Alice and Bob project the state into Z ⊗ Z basis. If they end up with
the first or the third state in the bracket of Eq. (A3), they will get perfect anti-correlation,
which will not contribute to errors. If they get the second state in the bracket of Eq. (A3),
their results are totally independent, which will cause an error with probability e0 = 1/2.
Thus the error probability introduced by a 2-photon-pair state is 1/6. Here we have only
considered the errors introduced by multi photon states, item 3 discussed in the beginning
of this Appendix. We should also take into account the effects of background counts and
intrinsic detector errors. With these modifications, the error rate of 2-photon-pair state is
given by
e2 = e0 − 2(e0 − ed)[1− (1− ηA)
2][1− (1− ηB)2]
3Y2
(A4)
where Y2 is given in Eq. (7). Eq. (A4) can be understood as follows. Only when Alice
and Bob project the Eq. (A3) into | ↔↔〉a| ll〉b or | ll〉a| ↔↔〉b and no background
count occurs, they have a probability of ed to get the wrong answer. Given a coincident
detection, the conditional probability for this case is 2[1− (1− ηA)2][1− (1− ηB)2]/3Y2. All
other cases, a background count, a double click and measuring different photon pairs, will
contribute an error probability e0 = 1/2.
Next, let us study the errors coming from the state |n−m,m〉a|m,n−m〉b. When Alice
detects at least one of n−m | l〉 photons but none of m | ↔〉 photons, and Bob detects at
least one of n −m | ↔〉 photons but none of m | l〉 photons, or both Alice and Bob have
bit flips of this case, they will end up with an error probability of ed. Given a coincident
detection, the conditional probability for these two cases is
1
Yn
{[1− (1− ηA)n−m](1− ηA)m[1− (1− ηB)n−m](1− ηB)m
+ [1− (1− ηA)m](1− ηA)n−m[1− (1− ηB)m](1− ηB)n−m}.
When Alice detects at least one of n−m | l〉 polarizations but none of m | ↔〉 polarizations,
and Bob detects at least one of m | l〉 polarizations but none of n−m | ↔〉 polarizations,
or both Alice and Bob have bit flips of this case, they will end up with an error probability
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of 1− ed. Given a coincident detection, the conditional probability for these two case is
1
Yn
{[1− (1− ηA)m](1− ηA)n−m[1− (1− ηB)n−m](1− ηB)m
+ [1− (1− ηA)n−m](1− ηA)m[1− (1− ηB)m](1− ηB)n−m}.
For all other cases, the error probability is e0. Thus the error probability for the state
|n−m,m〉a|m,n−m〉b is
enm =e0 − e0 − ed
Yn
{(1− ηA)n−m(1− ηB)n−m[1− (1− ηA)m][1− (1− ηB)m]
+ (1− ηA)m(1− ηB)m[1− (1− ηA)n−m][1− (1− ηB)n−m]
− (1− ηA)n−m(1− ηB)m[1− (1− ηA)m][1− (1− ηB)n−m]
− (1− ηA)m(1− ηB)n−m[1− (1− ηA)n−m][1− (1− ηB)m]}
=e0 − e0 − ed
Yn
[(1− ηA)n−m − (1− ηA)m][(1− ηB)n−m − (1− ηB)m]
(A5)
In general, for an n-photon-pair state described by Eq. (3), the error rate is given by
en =
1
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
enm
=
1
n+ 1
n∑
m=0
e0 − e0 − ed
Yn
[(1− ηA)n−m − (1− ηA)m][(1− ηB)n−m − (1− ηB)m]
= e0 − e0 − ed
(n+ 1)Yn
n∑
m=0
[(1− ηA)n−m − (1− ηA)m][(1− ηB)n−m − (1− ηB)m]
= e0 − 2(e0 − ed)
(n+ 1)Yn
[
1− (1− ηA)n+1(1− ηB)n+1
1− (1− ηA)(1− ηB) −
(1− ηA)n+1 − (1− ηB)n+1
ηB − ηA ]
(A6)
The overall QBER is given by
EλQλ =
∞∑
n=0
enYnP (n)
=e0Qλ −
∞∑
n=0
2(e0 − ed)λn
(1 + λ)n+2
[
1− (1− ηA)n+1(1− ηB)n+1
1− (1− ηA)(1− ηB) −
(1− ηA)n+1 − (1− ηB)n+1
ηB − ηA ]
=e0Qλ − 2(e0 − ed)ηAηBλ(1 + λ)
(1 + ηAλ)(1 + ηBλ)(1 + ηAλ+ ηBλ− ηAηBλ)
(A7)
where Qλ is the gain given in Eq. (9).
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APPENDIX B: OPTIMAL µ
The optimal µ for the coherent state QKD has already been discussed [8, 28]. Here we
need to find out the optimal µ for the entanglement PDC QKD. In the following calculation,
we will focus on optimizing the parameter λ (= µ/2) for the key generation rate given in
Eq. (11).
By assuming ηB to be small and neglecting Y0, we can simplify Eq. (9)
Qλ ≈ 2ηBλ[1− 1− ηA
(1 + ηAλ)3
]. (B1)
The overall QBER given in Eq. (10) can be simplified to
Eλ ≈ 1
2
− (1− 2ed)(1 + λ)(1 + ηAλ)
2(1 + 3λ+ 3ηAλ2 + η
2
Aλ
3)
. (B2)
In order to maximize the key generation rate, given by Eq. (11), the optimal λ satisfies
∂Qλ
∂λ
[1− (1 + f(Eλ))H2(Eλ)]−Qλ[1 + f(Eλ)]∂Eλ
∂λ
log2
1−Eλ
Eλ
= 0. (B3)
Here we treat f(Eλ) as a constant. In the following we will consider two extremes: ηA ≈ 1
and ηA ≪ 1.
When ηA ≈ 1, the overall gain and QBER are given by
Qλ ≈ 2ηBλ
Eλ ≈ 2ed + λ
2 + 2λ
.
(B4)
Thus, Eq. (B3) can be simplified to
1− [1 + f(Eλ)]H2(Eλ)− λ[1 + f(Eλ)] 1− 2ed
2(1 + λ)2
log2
1− Eλ
Eλ
= 0. (B5)
When ηA ≪ 1,
Qλ ≈ 2ηAηBλ(1 + 3λ)
Eλ ≈ ed + λ + edλ
1 + 3λ
.
(B6)
Thus, Eq. (B3) can be simplified to
(1 + 6λ){1− [1 + f(Eλ)]H2(Eλ)} − λ[1 + f(Eλ)]1− 2ed
1 + 3λ
log2
1−Eλ
Eλ
= 0. (B7)
The solutions to Eqs. (B5) and (B7) are shown in FIG. 6.
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FIG. 6: Plot of the optimal µ in terms of ed for the entanglement PDC QKD. f(ed) = 1.22.
From FIG. 6, we can see that the optimal µ = 2λ for the entanglement PDC is in the
order of 1, µ = 2λ = O(1), which will lead the final key generation rate to be R = O(ηAηB).
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